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FLOSS Firms, Users and Communities: a Viable
Match?
Nicolas Jullien, Jean-Benoît Zimmermann
Abstract—The participation of ﬁrms in Free/Libre/Open
Source Software (FLOSS) communities is growing and is in-
creasingly debated amongst scholars. As [41] explained, FLOSS
needs proﬁt and we do not know successfull ﬂoss products without
ﬁrms in their ecosystem, either being via the ﬁnancial support
of foundations (Eclipse, Linux) or the commercial offering of
products or services based on speciﬁc FLOSS products (SQL,
RedHat). Various points of view have been proposed, but most
of the time, scholars studied either the implication of ﬁrms within
a community or the integration of ﬂoss into their market strategy,
but not both. In this article, we plead for a more structured and
global analysis, based on industrial economics tools, and thus
starting from the basic conditions of the computer market and of
the buyers’ competence in software development (the ’dominant
user’s skill). This conceptual framework helps to distinguish the
different roles (understood as ’social roles’) ﬁrms may play in
the FLOSS ecosystem and, speciﬁcally the variation in their
involvement.
Index Terms—’Free’/’libre’ or ’open source’ software, Indus-
trial economics, dominant user’s skill, ﬁrms’ roles.
JEL: L11, L15, L22, L86
I. INTRODUCTION
Free/Libre/Open Source Software (FLOSS) has became
an important economic issue, and is changing the computer
industry, with the decline of some businesses, such as the Unix
producers (SCO bought by Caldera, SUN bought by Oracle...)
And today, since the IBM’s 2001 initiative to invest in Linux
other FLOSS products, ﬁrms see to integrate the products and
the production into their business strategy. And an increasing
number of companies are getting involved in the communities
of development ( [38]), potentially changing the structure and
the aim of the volunteer based organization.
The aim of this paper is to propose an analytic framework to
better understand the roles played by ﬁrms in the communities
and to see at which level industrial business strategies can
match with the communities’ organization [61].
So, if we refer to the levels of analysis of roles proposed
by [24], this work tries to complete the studies conducted
on FLOSS communities data regarding ﬁrms’ behavior by
ﬁrst proposing deﬁnition of the role of ﬁrms based on the
market the ﬁrms are involved in and second a study of the
questions raised by ﬁrms’ behaviors for the commitment of
developers to communities and for the long term stability of
the latter. The article starts from a discussion of the literature
regarding relationships between ﬁrms and Floss, and especially
an analysis of the reasons for the ﬁrms to get involved in the
communities (section 2). We propose thus a classiﬁcation of
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the different businesses built using FLOSS (section 4), based
on a segmentation of the computer market, thus of Industrial
economics theories (section 3). This allows us to propose a
classiﬁcation of what ﬁrms do in FLOSS communities, what
we call their “roles” (section 5). In the conclusive section,
we discuss the point raised by the study of these roles, both
technically (how to study the roles) and strategicaly (impact
of the ﬁrms in the involvement of people in the communities
and on the stability of the communities).
II. PREVIOUS WORK ON FIRMS AND FLOSS
COMMUNITIES.
In the last decade, an abundant and growing literature has
discussed this question.
We believe that this literature can be split into two ap-
proaches, two points of view based on two data sources, the
ﬁrst looking at the production side and the second at the market
side to explain ﬁrms’ interest in FLOSS.
The production side starts from the communities and evalu-
ates the level and manner of ﬁrms’ involvement in them. The
research agenda, as put forward by [56], is to understand
how ﬁrms involve themselves in a speciﬁc community and
what these communities can offer them. From an organization
science point of view, the question is how agents organize
themselves to manage distributed innovation and under what
conditions ﬁrms can capture part of this innovation for busi-
ness purposes. Here, we are close to the analysis of Firms’
’social roles’ in Online Communities, social roles understood
as [5] deﬁned them. The advantage of such studies is the
availability of data from communities.
These roles are not directly studied, as these studies examine
the roles played by individual people. Some of them belong to
companies and the roles of the companies are deduced from
the roles of the users. However, their exploitation leads to
crucial results for understanding the links between business
and open source. In 2005, [38], analyzing a survey of
287 communities (i.e. people active in FLOSS development
projects), showed the importance of business participation in
FLOSS communities, as “a majority of [their] respondents are
skilled and experienced professionals working in IT-related
jobs, with approximately 40 percent being paid to participate
in the F/OSS project.” [25], studying the “embedded” Linux
system, showed that business involvement pursued several
strategies and that ﬁrms did not reveal all the codes they
produced but rather carefully selected their contributions. [15],
in a study of the “GNOME” graphic interface project, based on
the theory developed by [48], argue that by hiring developers









































a complementary asset important for building their products
and services. [28] identify, amongst the various FLOSS
projects a “money-driven cluster” where “IT vendors’ motives
are economic. In this cluster, signiﬁcant investments have been
made in projects that will serve as complementary assets to
drive revenues to vendors’ core businesses”.
However, these authors were looking at already well-
established communities, where the software developed is
shared by numerous actors, people or ﬁrms. This can hardly
explain why some companies, like MySQL AB, which owns
the entire eponymous database software, open source it and
yet remain responsible for most of its development, as if it
were the core asset of their business1.
On the other hand, from a strategy and management sciences
point of view, some scholars have looked at the business side
and explained the use of FLOSS products in terms of the
characteristics of the market and ﬁrms’ positioning on this
market.
The two main issues here are the deﬁnition of a business
model (what do you sell when choosing FLOSS?), and the
links between a business model and involvement in communi-
ties. [7] have surveyed the literature on the different “FLOSS
business models” and classiﬁed them “into ﬁve types: (a)
Support Contracts; (b) Split Licensing; (c) Community; (d)
Valued-added closed source; (e) Macro R&D Infrastructure”.
They have looked at the advantages and disadvantages of
each model, proposing a case study for each, but without
investigating involvement in the communities, and the market
conditions under which each model is most efﬁcient. Survey-
ing Italian ﬁrms, [5] have proposed a deﬁnition of “FLOSS
based business” and different reasons for ﬁrms to participate
in FLOSS development. But they have not really explained
the link between the kind of business model and the degree
of involvement in communities.
The ﬁrst to establish a link between these two aspects
were Finnish scholars. Surveying Finnish ﬁrms, [13, 14]
showed that to a large extent, the variety of ﬁrms’ involvement
in FLOSS can be understood in the light of the position
of software in the ﬁrm’s business model (as core activity
or not). Again using data on Finnish ﬁrms, but at product
level, [37] remarked that “it seems that factors other than
those typically found to explain differences in entrepreneurial
innovation behavior such as ﬁrm size and age account for
the differences in the product and license type strategies of
the software companies. [His] data indicate that the ﬁrm
ownership structure has a major inﬂuence for the software
ﬁrms’ product-level business strategies” (p. 123).
If these studies prove the link between the market and
involvement in FLOSS, they suffer from some limitations.
They are rather descriptive and do not propose explanations
for the variations in ﬁrms’ behaviour in similar markets: why
do Asus or Dell install Linux on their computers without
1This means that any developer/contributor wanting to contribute to the
ofﬁcial MySQL product has to transfer her copyright to MySQL. http://forge.
mysql.com/contribute/cla.php. Once owning the whole copyright, the ﬁrm can
manage a dual licensing scheme, distributing the product under the license it
wants, either GPL or more classical closed license. So a customer that does
not wish to reveal further enhancements of the source code has to keep these
enhancements to herself.
contributing to the development while HP and IBM do? This
may be because these authors look at the level of ﬁrms without
looking at the differences between the different branches of the
industry, as [57] did on the server/operating system market
(what he called the “platform market”).
The present work therefore belongs to this second category
of approaches. It tries to systematize West’s approach to the
whole computer industry in order to provide explanations for
the variations of ﬁrms involvement in FLOSS, in terms of
intensity of participations within communities and in terms of
responsibility in the organization of the communities.
III. SOME INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS.
A. Theoretical background.
Industrial economics [44] explains that an industry is
characterized by the basic conditions of each kind of activities:
characteristics of the products, of the users, hence of the
demand, but also of the juridical environment (intellectual
property protection, for instance). These basic conditions draw
the main aspects of the market structure (source of added
value, competitive advantages, sources of barriers to entry) and
the nature of the competition (ﬁrms behavior, in terms of price,
position, etc.) The efﬁciency of the ﬁrms (their performance)
would depend on a good adequacy of their strategy (behavior,
organization) to the market structure, and to their capacity
to reshape this market structure, increasing, for instance, the
barriers to entry [51].
According to this, ﬁrms FLOSS involvement may be seen as
a consequence of the evolution of the structure of the market
(new sources of added value or of competitive advantage), but
also a consequence of strategic positioning of ﬁrms, which
may see FLOSS as a tool to improve their efﬁciency, but also
to curve the market in order to attract new customers, or to
price new offers.
B. The basic conditions of the computer industry.
There is a wide diversity of actors in the industry in terms
of both products and size. Successive waves of innovations
and company strategies have led to a progressive reshaping
of industry borders and structure. For example, Internet has
impacted the software production, pushing ﬁrms to integrate
more services in their offers, designing new ways of selling
software based applications, such as Saas (software as a
service) ( [12], pp 86-127; [6]).
However, the foundations of the industry (the basic con-
ditions) have remained unchanged, since those described by
[23, 60, 46, 12]: IT products are built by assembling hardware
and software units in a given architecture, and these products
(isolated or integrated into networks) are used as parts of
information systems and solutions.
On the basis of such technical organization, it is possible
to distinguish three large types of “vertical specialization”: i.
component producers, ii. computers and IT devices suppli-
ers, iii. the market for applications. All these segments are
concerned with software production, as even chipset manu-









































in the machine integrating their component. But, since the be-
ginning of the 1970s, some ﬁrms have specialized in software
production and, since the beginning of the 1980s, in software
publishing (packaged software). According to [12] (chap.
2), the application market can be split between service and
product, and for the product side between business specialized
offers and global, platform offers.
These three typical strategic orientations are historically sit-
uated and gave rise to a market segmentation that corresponds
to different degrees of user sensitivity to price, variety and
speciﬁcity of the offer.
1) The “packaged software” business solution providers:
First, during the 1980s and 1990s, a growing number
of users sought to reduce the costs and uncertainty re-
lated to customized development by acquiring software
packages that could be installed and adapted to their
speciﬁc needs and constraints, with the help of service
companies accredited by the software editor ( [27], p.
98). These hybrid offers of “packages”, combining stan-
dardized goods and customized services, were highly
successful in the ﬁeld of professional dedicated solu-
tions, both for management needs (ERP such as SAP)
and for technical software (middleware applications,
compilers, development tools like those from Ilog) or
branch-speciﬁc applications (like software for computer-
assisted design or computer-assisted manufacturing from
Dassault System or others).
With the development of networks within and, more recently,
outside ﬁrms, with the spreading of the Internet, a grow-
ing number of heterogeneous users have shared a growing
number of applications (mainly those allowing information
exchange and sharing). This network effect and the related
need for standardization have had important consequences on
further technological orientation. It was necessary to ensure
the availability of a wide portfolio of software tools that could
meet the needs of all these, both for expert and for unskilled
users, within common or separate organizations. Two kinds of
strategies can be observed as responding to this necessity:
1) The platform producers: On the one hand, software
publishers have broadened the scope of their offer by
supplying a variety of application tools that can be
combined with their core product or by supplying the
latter with multiple versions. This enables them to better
meet users’ speciﬁc needs while keeping production
costs down. The archetypal example of such a “plat-
form strategy” is Microsoft, which now offers different
versions of its operating system for servers, corporate
users or private individuals, as does its open-source
competitor RedHat now. The same kind of strategy
can be observed for Oracle, which sells professional
applications developed on its database technology, and
which has recently bought BEA and SUN, after other
takeovers, to enlarge its applications portfolio2. Another
2“Ellison saw that if Oracle played its cards right, the conﬂuence
of the database, the Internet, and the Web browser could displace
the operating system as the focal point of computing and erode
Microsoft’s industry dominance”. Brent Schlender, CNN Money, 1999.
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1999/05/24/260276/index.htm
illustration is given by Symbian in the ﬁeld of operating
systems (OS) for mobile applications.
2) The architects: On the other hand, service companies,
especially the large ones, such as IBM and Cap Gemini,
have tried to master a wide range of software tech-
nologies and products which they can combine and
adapt to the constraints and the existing equipment of
their customers. They intervene as “architects” of their
customers’ information systems. Smaller local services
companies have a similar position, also providing infras-
tructure services but on a smaller scale (single server
maintenance instead of a large IT infrastructure) or
aimed at speciﬁc professional needs (like IT infrastruc-
ture maintenance services in the food industry).
All these segments are characterized by strong imperfect
competition regimes due to diverse increasing return effects
(economies of scale in production, high sunk costs – R&D,
distribution channels, etc. -, technological interrelatedness and
learning), to use Arthur’s terms [2, 3]. The consequence is
that they are dominated by a small number of ﬁrms. In these
oligopolies, differentiation strategies largely play an important
role, and are of two kinds:
 horizontal differentiation either related to the integration
of new features and high performance tools or to mar-
ket segmentation (for instance through hard-soft-content
bundling), aiming at segmenting the market between the
different participants in the oligopoly;
 vertical differentiation. In that case, ﬁrms may propose
cheaper products (like notebooks, or Linux based PC
servers competing with traditional Unix servers). this is
a classic in the computer industry to enter the market
(Digital entered the market with a smaller, cheaper com-
puter called a “mini-computer”, as Apple did creating the
Personal computer market). They may also improve the
offer for the same price (as Microsoft did when adding
to is operating system a browser for the same price).
These strategies are efﬁcient if, and only if the users are able to
perceive the difference between two offers. Thus the efﬁciency
of these strategies, the possibility o use them depend of users’
skills.
C. The users.
As far as the user side is concerned, we will distinguish
three main types of users according to their relation to the
product and the technology ( [60, 36, 54, 55]). The ﬁrst is the
category of “Naive customers or users” (that we denote N)
who are not endowed with noticeable technical skills and do
not individually weigh very much in economic terms. They are
overall sensitive to prices and even if they may react to new
characteristics of products or to branding issues, they are not
capable to translate their needs and satisfaction into technical
terms. The second is the category of “Kogut-Metiu Users”
(KM)3 who are not able to contribute to software development
but can generate new features or innovations by revealing
their own needs. KM users are sensitive to price and quality









































arguments The third category is that of the “Von Hippel Users”
(VH) who may act as “sources of innovation” ( [54, 53])
able to contribute to software development by proposing
improvements or modiﬁcations, developing it by themselves
or at least able to design the technical speciﬁcations.
Users play a double role, deriving from both their eco-
nomic and technical standing. Depending on the market, and
especially their bargaining power in it, the users are more
or less able to select the (technical) offers. At one extreme,
users and contracts in the global service/architects market are
related to large structures, with substantial buying capacities
and generally endowed with signiﬁcant technical skills. So
they are likely to inﬂuence economic and technical choices.
At the other extreme, low price computers address a mass
market where individual users, in their vast majority have little
budget and/or few skills. Their inﬂuence on market evolution
is negligible at an individual level but of global importance
in terms of elasticity to prices. But this analysis should be
nuanced in the case of intermediation by a “prescriber”, who
orders and deﬁnes the characteristics for a large number of
machines, destined for mass distribution by his/her own means
(local government for secondary schools, education in rural
area in developing countries4...) That’s the reason why, when
speaking about the “user”, we mean the person who negotiates
or chooses the characteristics of the good, who is not always
the end user. Of course different types of users co-exist in
any given market. But the dispersion of users’ skills in the
related technology and more particularly in software doesn’t
follow the same distribution from one segment to another.
Even if skilled users are likely to be found in any market,
they may represent a share too small to play a signiﬁcant
role in it and catch the interest of the ﬁrms concerned for
their speciﬁc demand. Conversely, thanks to the Internet, and
regarding FLOSS, a handful of very talented users around
the world can weigh enough together to develop a FLOSS
alternative to private offers and contribute to the emergence
of a FLOSS business offer. So, what we denote users’ skills
appears as a subtle mix between competences and number,
which could yield a “weighted sum of competences” [32].
D. Structure and strategies.
So, in a market where the dominant user is naive, ﬁrms can
only differentiate on prices, as it is the only signal understood.
The more competent users are, the more ﬁrms can differentiate
vertically on quality or horizontally via the creation of niche
products for speciﬁc needs and users.
If we focus on computer and software and services, we see
that users’ competency is a key parameter for the structure of
the industry and for explaining how ﬁrms consider software
and invest in development.
1) Hardware.: When speaking of computers, we think
about machines which are more or less dedicated to speciﬁc
uses. At one extreme computers can be used for a wide
scope of applications provided by the software that is acquired
4See, for instance, the competition between Microsoft and Mandriva
to supply 17,000 computers in Nigeria. http://www.computerworlduk.com/
management/government-law/public-sector/news/index.cfm?newsid=6124
and installed on them. At the other extreme, video game
consoles or multimedia players are devoted to a single range
of applications, while in between, mobile devices like PDAs
or mobile phones are built to support a growing number of
applications5.
Vertical competitive advantage is given by better perfor-
mances/cost ratios (for instance lower price laptops or better
computation capacities for servers or high quality laptops),
while horizontal differentiation is based on the integration
of new features and high performance tools (as Samsung
did when proposing a fold display mobile phone) or to
market segmentation through hard-soft-content bundling on
new features or applications (Mario Broth video games being
only on Nintendo machines).
But regarding the objectives of these machines, and thus the
skill of the people buying them, the structure of the markets
and of the competition varies. We will take the example of the
computer market to illustrate this.
Servers are intended to manage, deliver and protect in-
formation on the networks. They must be high-performance,
stable, but also compatible with network standards and are
bought by VH users. Microcomputers (with a growing market
share for laptop computers) are used by end users, mainly
as personal computers. In the server market, several Unix
systems still exist, and this is case of horizontal differentiation
as they are not compatible, so users have to choose between
them. For high end customers or needs, mainframes still exist
with dedicated operating systems. If we look at FLOSS Unix-
like systems, some users prefer BSD (being being FreeBSD,
OpenBSD or NetBSD) to Linux. So, even if a growing part
of the market is answered by PC servers running either
Linux or Microsoft, it is clear that the quality purpose and
niche market strategies are possible, because users are able
to evaluate the performance and the matching of the offers
to their needs, and are ready to pay for that. In the Personal
computer market, Apple has a marginal market share, as does
Linux, and the Windows-Intel couple dominates the market.
IBM sold its PC division to Lenovo in 2004, because it was
not proﬁtable any more, after Compaq dropped in the mid
1990s and the difﬁculties of Dell today6 proves that the PC
market is dominated by a price war. This is not surprising
as the dominant user is naive and thus only price sensitive.
The consequence is that ﬁrms are continuously seeking to
decrease their cost and their price, as it is difﬁcult for them
to differenciate horizontally.
2) Software and service.: Platform manufacturers may
have been the most studied. In a nutshell, they are involved
in a classic arbitration in the dispute over standards7: to
attract the maximum of users on the platform to attract
the maximum of applications producers, and vice et versa.
Linux distribution editors story is another example of the
5This distinction between specialized and generalist devices is evolving, as
Sony intends its PS3 to be the media center at home. But this has not so far
impacted on the industrial structure.
6http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Infotech/Hardware/Dell_may_sell_
its_plants_worldwide_Reports/articleshow/3449300.cms
7On standard theories, see the discussions by [33, 34, 35], [48], [40, 39],









































importance of the competence of the demand to create a
market. RedHat, SuSE, Mandriva (formally Mandrakesoft),
were among the ﬁrst commercial actors to enter the market
using FLOSS. This could be seen as obvious on a mass
market with rather naive users and a signiﬁcant prices based
competition. But today, the retail store sales of OS package
represent a negligible part of the revenue of such ﬁrms8, and
a major part targets the industrial market. One can explain
this fact by the development of broadband connexion. But
more than that, the competences of the users matter. PCs are
shipped with an already installed OS and few of the buyers
are skilled enough to install a different OS. Additionally they
have incentives to do it because the ﬁrst installed OS has
already been paid for with the computer. On the emerging
OS for PC server market things work differently. Most of the
users, of VH or KM type, are aware of the technical issues
for installing and conﬁguring an OS. It is also easier to buy a
machine without an operating system installed. FLOSS gives
them access to a more open and more adaptable Unix-like
operating system, than they could ﬁnd in the traditional Unix
offer, and they are able to choose the Unix they prefer. So,
even if they are less price sensitive, FLOSS based servers
may help to differentiate vertically (better quality over price
ratio) and horizontally (with the existence of niche Unix).
The practice of combined offers, or packages, integrating
a standard base and customized services has made its mark
in the professional solutions, whether it is for the company
management systems (ERP, whose symbolic model is SAP),
or the "IT" tools ("middleware" applications, compilers,
development tools such as those proposed by the Ilog
company), or the solutions speciﬁc to a branch, a profession
(such as the subsequent version of computer-aided design
proposed by the company Dassault Systems). The producer
sells “three A services” [30]: quality Assurance, Adaptation
(more or less rapidly) to the user’s needs, and user Assistance
to use the tool. This is the model of “sustained technical
capacity” [17, 22]. The core competence of the ﬁrm is in this
capacity to make the product evolve to follow the needs of
the users, but to make this evolution “sustainable” (ie making
it still appropriable and without a decrease in performance,
for bug reasons). If these tools are professional tools, users
are skilled enough to express their needs requirement (for
instance, if they are doctors, that the product is up to date
regarding drugs and drugs interaction). But they are not
always skilled enough in computer science to develop these
requirements by themselves, or even to translate them into
tender speciﬁcations or in technical speciﬁcations. Here, it is
the content of the users’ feedback which may vary according
to their computer skills.
Service companies, or “IT Architects”, and especially the
largest (IBM, Cap Gemini), endeavor to develop a global ap-
8RedHat stopped this activity (see ﬁnancial report 2006, p. 31); the
consumer market (including distributors, OEM sales, e-commerce and Club)
represented 2.54Md’ (45% of the total earnings) showing a 23.4% decrease
for Mandriva 2005-2006 ﬁscal year; SuSE has been bought by Novell, so
these revenues are diluted.
proach to IS and company organization (by acquiring strategic
consultancy companies such as Ernst & Young), while remain-
ing less dependent on one type of software, in order to be able
to adapt to the constraints and to the current circumstances of
these customers. But the retail service companies behave in
the same way, supplying infrastructure on a more local and
smaller scale (maintenance of a single server, instead of a
global infrastructure), either at a more specialized level, for
example in terms of sector (e.g. maintenance services for
the food-processing industry), or on a more reduced software
base (distributors-installers-adapters of one of the platforms,
these are Microsoft, Oracle, or RedHat "certiﬁed" companies).
The vocation of all these companies is to develop, in the
customer’s interest, individualized solutions and to support
these solutions. We are approaching what [17, 22] described
as the "provision of human capacities", in the sense that what
makes their singularity (or their core competence) is that they
bring together a team of specialists of differing software, but
also of customers’ vocational specialists. In the following,
we will call this “architect strategy”. In other words, the
efﬁciency of these ﬁrms is in producing tender speciﬁcation or
technical speciﬁcations meeting their clients’ needs. If these
companies are rather technical agnostics as they have to install
the tools their clients need (or want), it is obvious that the
more they dominate a tool, the easier its adaptation is, the
easier their job is. This point enlarges the strategy ﬁeld, as
ﬁrms may differentiate vertically (increasing the number of
tools mastered, the number of professional domains covered),
but also horizontally, specializing on a domain or a software,
as the SAP consultants. But, once again, in any case, the more
computer skilled their clients are, the easier the discussion may
be [16].
3) A summary of ﬁrms’ strategies regarding software.:
This overview of the computer market may be summarized
in the following way: the more skilled people are, the more
the strategies increase because it is easier to differentiate
horizontally, trying to address users’ needs ever closer, thus
creating niche markets. When users are too computer illiterate,
competition is restricted to price. This explains the industrial
appropriation of FLOSS, and its variance from one market to
another and the competitive advantage FLOSS gives.
IV. FLOSS AS A STRATEGIC TOOL IN FIRMS’ HANDS.
It is clear that the cost of licenses offers a price advantage.
Moreover, the fact that the customer can evaluate the product
without buying a license is also an advantage in terms of
dissemination. But this is not different from a freeware, and
does not explain the success of FLOSS. Actually, we will show
that FLOSS (and FLOSS based business) succeeds when this
success is based on the open source and community feedback
framework assets.
A. Hardware.
This may be the sector where the link between structure of









































In the server market, producers have habitually provided
proprietary solutions with proprietary Unix9. The rise of PC
servers has permitted some users to avoid such a bundling
problem; moreover, using Linux or another free Unix means
a cheaper offer (vertical advantage) reusing Unix programs
(content) portfolio. Here suppliers are dealing with highly-
skilled VH clients that have forced them to adopt FLOSS. The
competitive advantage of FLOSS is its openness, allowing it
to be tuned to speciﬁc needs, as proven by Google, which
runs more than 40,000 servers with “customized versions of
Linux”10.
On the segment of notebooks, where users are mainly naive,
competition is overall based on prices. When Asus entered
the market with its eee-PC, it used Linux for price reasons,
because Microsoft Windows Vista was too costly in terms
of resources needed and price to be competitive. Since then,
considering the success of this market, Microsoft has designed
a speciﬁc, downgraded version of Windows XP for these
computers, and today, Linux market share has dropped to
around 10%11. In that case free software is considered as
a freeware and does not seem to provide any competitive
advantage. It has only been used to force the monopoly to
drop its prices.
B. Software and service.
1) Software platforms.: We already shown that Linux has
succeeded where users were VH. Of course for price reasons,
but also for quality reasons: people could choose a system
better adapted to their needs as it is more adaptable, as did
Google. For a platform editor, the attractiveness of its platform
is a growing function of the application available on it. The
asset of a FLOSS platform is to allow the creation of a
community of application providers, which will adapt their
product to their platform. And, as these applications are not
at the same level of maturity, since they may be incompatible,
there is a need for an actor granting this compatibility, helping
ﬁrms to select the applications they need. In a word, the “3A
services” (assistance, assurance and adaptation to the use).
RedHat is the best example of such a strategy, with on
one hand, the Fedora community to foster “innovation”12,
the availability of applications on a Linux platform, and on
the other hand, RedHat enterprise, when you want to buy
assurance and assistance13.
2) Packages.: We said that a growing source of revenue
comes from, again, “3A services”. Currently, the main evolu-
tion for those ﬁrms is to switch from a demand pull strategy
(functionalities are developed to stimulate/create the demand)
to an ’on-demand’ development (development when required
and paid for or carried out by the users). Therefore, FLOSS
is used to increase the business feedback from users and by
considering openness as a way to reduce transaction costs and
9See [57] for a full discussion of FLOSS strategies in that sector .
10See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_platform for a summary of the
Google platform and usefull links on that topic and [47] for a whole
presentation of Google.
11http://www.i4u.com/article23707.html
12See the presentation of Fedora at:http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Overview
13Also very well explained on RedHat’s Web: http://www.redhat.com/rhel/
as a signal of quality. This explains why open source business
products are developed mainly in “business” software (ERP,
computer infrastructure software like compilers), where users
ready to pay for conﬁguration, maintenance or assistance ser-
vices are numerous. We will distinguish two kind of structures,
again regarding the computer skills of the users:
1) When users are VH software professionals, we ﬁnd
one ﬁrm organizing cooperation around its brand named
product. The producer approves the contributions, en-
sures stability of the tool and helps developers to use
it. If some individual contributor becomes important (in
terms of contribution volume/quality/innovative aspect),
s/he may be hired by a producer, with reduced recruit-
ment costs and risks (ACT or MySQL but also some
small services companies are using this method). By
contributing to innovation, the developers (and possibly
companies using the tool), are therefore guaranteed that
their needs will be taken into account more quickly
and integrated into the product (which is a fundamental
factor in reducing costs, according to [54]).
2) When users are more KM, ﬁrms are more service ori-
ented. The open source asset is more in being a ﬂexible,
adaptable input, developed by a consortium of informa-
tion system consultants sharing and co-developing the
tools they are basing their business on, with sometimes
a two-level organization, where a software producer and
editor of a tool deals with information system resellers.
The text-book examples are Compiere ERP and CRM,
or Zope CMS, where there is an editing ﬁrm, which
sells its services and products as in case one, but mainly
to “partners”, service companies, as shown in ﬁgure 1
on the following page. In the second case, resellers
act as service, architect companies we will discuss in
the following paragraph. In both cases, the interest of
FLOSS is its ﬂexibility which is used to adapt itself to
the client’s needs and the license, which garantees that
the product will always be available, as the modiﬁcations
performed by other ﬁrms. the consortium organization,
decreases the cost of development for each member (as it
is shared) and facilitates and accelerates the achievement
of a global presence for the product.
When naive users are dominant, it does not seem that ﬁrms
manage to do a direct business based on FLOSS products.
Even if some FLOSS offers exist for that segment, such as
Open Ofﬁce or Firefox, their market share remains small14.
We do not know ﬁrms dedicated to them, and, according to us,
ﬁrms’ support is more a consequence of platform or hardware
providers strategies: these actors need these commodities for
their platform to be adopted by VH or KM users, and FLOSS
is a means to create a consortium to develop it (as SUN does
by supporting Open Ofﬁce development).
14Some sites estimate Firefox market share around 20% (see
http://marketshare.hitslink.com/browser-market-share.aspx?qprid=0http:
//marketshare.hitslink.com/browser-market-share.aspx?qprid=0) but they
probably over estimate it, as they look at the browser used to visit site,
which thus favor the browsers used by Web intensive users, which are more









































Figure 1: The Compiere “ecosystem” (taken from:
http://www.compiere.com/partners/)
3) Architects.: As Horn (2004) points out, assembling
components requires access to the source codes (problem of
compatibility), and their adaptation to different needs (of users
and other components). They must be available in the form
of open-source software (therefore legally modiﬁable). The
competitive advantage in using FLOSS, in addition to price,
is therefore the ability to offer an assembled set of compo-
nents with greater interoperability, which should increase the
quality of the ﬁnal product, on a market where the quality
of services is one of the recurrent problems (see De Bandt,
1995). Revenues are generated by assembling and adaptation
services, as is the case for any traditional service company.
The only uncertainty about the model concerns the availability
of the components: who will develop them and who will
maintain them? Moreover, the customers of these companies
may already have (proprietary) programs installed that need to
be taken into account. In the end, an open source strategy could
even be a guarantee of means (maximum use of free software),
but not a guarantee of the results (use of only free software),
unless the customer requests this, since in this situation, s/he
has the last word.
Two kinds of ﬁrms use FLOSS today: newcomers who special-
ize in FLOSS architecture, using FLOSS as a vertical (price)
and horizontal differentiation asset15, and incumbents, such as
IBM for its service activities. Traditional service ﬁrms like
Cap Gemini are more agnostic with regard to the technologies
15As explained by [45], one of the main strategy for newcomers in
technological market is technological differentiation. Basing its offer on
new FLOSS products can be seen as a way for new service companies to
differentiate.
used and the intellectual property regime involved. They will
generally follow the customers’ demand which depends on
their ability to keep up with the development of the project.
These customers are most often large organizations, skilled
computer users that are receptive to the opportunity to integrate
the most advanced software components, developed under
FLOSS licenses. So they are becoming increasingly involved
in FLOSS as the market grows and matures16. Global service
ﬁrms’ Web site are quite explicit on this strategy17.
C. The dependence of users’ skill.
Table I summarizes the section.
What seems clear after this rather qualitative analysis, and
was formally demonstrated by [32], it that the skill of the
users matters for understanding the level of implication of
ﬁrms in FLOSS. When users are naive, ﬁrms may use FLOSS,
but only for price reasons, in the same way as they could use
freeware. The more VH users are, the more complex strategies
regarding FLOSS are, and the greater ﬁrms’ involvement
and participation. In some cases, when users are VH, ﬁrms
may even produce FLOSS and animate the community like
Ada Core Technology for Ada 2005 and MySQL AB for
MySQL data bases do. But in any case, FLOSS is regarded as
open source software. This means that in that case, ﬁrms use
FLOSS for technical reasons (sustainability, ﬂexibility) and
for innovative reasons (increasing the speed and quality of
feedback).
V. THE ROLE OF FIRMS IN FLOSS COMMUNITIES.
The consequence of ﬁrms market position is that they
will behave differently according to the signiﬁcance of FLOS
software or FLOS community in the speciﬁcity of its offer: is
it a complementary or a core asset for this offer? According
to the theory [48], if yes, ﬁrm should invest a lot to manage
this asset, if not, it should not invest at all, buying or using
it as it is (as a component “of the shelves”). This has been
conﬁrmed by a survey of FLOSS business based ﬁrms [31].
A. Naive users, the freeware strategy, the community as a
commodity.
As, in that case, the aim of using FLOSS is to propose
the lowest price possible, ﬁrms will not invest in FLOSS
development more than the effort needed to adapt the software
to their product(s): this would increase their cost. So FLOSS
may be seen as a free commodity, a freeeware.
Of course, one might put forward that such strategies have
a ﬂavor of free-riding and the risk is to demotivate the most
committed people in the communities, seeing others drawing
16In 2005, Gartner forecasted that “[in] 2008, 95 percent of Global 2000 or-
ganizations will have formal open-source acquisition and management strate-
gies” (http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=492152). In their 2008 study,
they said that “Adoption of open-source software (OSS) is becoming per-
vasive, with 85 percent of companies surveyed currently using OSS in their
enterprises and the remaining 15 percent expecting to in the next 12 month”
(http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=801412).










































Table I: Firms’ FLOSS strategy according to the skill of the users.
Naive Kogut-Metiu von Hippel
Hardware FLOSS as a Freeware




FLOSS to create a consortium on comodities
development. No business. Ex.: Open Ofﬁce
and Firefox are installed in computer to
increase the applications available for the same
price.
FLOSS as technical tool increasing the quality over
price ratio via horizontal (adaptation to the needs)
and vertical (cheaper use) differentiation. Ex.: PC
servers runing Linux or *BSD.
Platforms No FLOSS strategy FLOSS to create a consortium on commodities
development. No business. Ex.: Open Ofﬁce
and Firefox.
FLOSS to foster applications availability. Firms sell




No FLOSS strategy FLOSS to create a consortium of consulting
ﬁrms selling adaptation of the product.
FLOSS to create a closer relationship with users
(quicker and better feedbacks). Firms sell 3A
services. Ex.: MySQL or Ada Core Technology.
Service FLOSS to propose
cheaper services? No
example known.
FLOSS as a ﬂexible commodity to propose/sell
cheaper service solutions. Ex.: Compiere
ecosystem.
FLOSS as a ﬂexible commodity to meet users’
demand and to propose more ﬂexible solutions.
Ex.: Cap Gemini, IBM global Service
proﬁts from their own voluntary work18. However, by adopting
FLOSS products, those ﬁrms participate in the expansion of
the FLOSS users’ network for given open software, such as the
operating system Linux or the “Open Ofﬁce” ofﬁce application
suite. In a competition regime in which the battle for network
externalities and standards play a crucial role, this may be
considered as a strong boost to FLOSS, that can at least win
the community’s neutrality if not approval.
B. Business packages for VH users, the community, a core
asset.
As far as business packages are concerned, the speciﬁc
asset of the producer lies in its package knowledge and in
its capacity to manage the dynamics of evolution. This makes
the open sourcing of a software the speciﬁc asset of the ﬁrm
which owns it: on the technology markets where the cus-
tomers are computing developers, revealing the code facilitates
cooperation. The producer organizes the collaboration in a
“symbiotic” relationship (using the terms of [13]). Developers
(possibly companies using the tool), by providing their own
innovations, are thereby assured that their needs will be taken
into account more rapidly and integrated into the product, a
crucial point to reduce their costs ( [54]); from the producer’s
point of view, this decrease the R&D cost as the users provide
him/her with new feature requirements and, more original,
implementation; on the other hand, only the one who integrates
contributions is capable of verifying and of guaranteeing their
correct functioning and to help clients to use it. So, a FLOSS
based package model means that the ﬁrms which publishe the
software remain heavily involved in its development in order
to control it. As their core competence lies on the management
of the software edited, the companies should only invest in the
software they edit, and the involvement of salaried developers
in other projects should not be encouraged19.
C. Services to VH and KM users, the community as an
complementary asset.
In between these two extreme cases of involvement int
communities are service ﬁrms. The only uncertainty in their
18See [21]for a discussion of that particular point.
19 [31] veriﬁed these two points.
FLOSS business model arises from the availability and the
quality of FLOSS components: who develop(s) them, who
maintain(s) them? So they need to evaluate these components
and to monitor their evolution20. This need for evaluation
and control increasingly depends on the importance of the
component for their business and that of their clients. We may
even formulate the hypothesis that the more skilled the users
are, the more the ﬁrm must master the technology, because of
the growing level of complexity of the feedbacks and demand.
And to be able to integrate knowledge and innovation
from the open-source communities, open-source ﬁrms have to
develop internally efﬁcient capabilities of absorption, an essen-
tial condition to capitalize and internalize the communities’
contribution and the users’ feedbacks to improve their own
product quality. [14] working on the relations between ﬁrms
and open-source communities show that those ﬁrms need “to
develop sufﬁcient absorptive capacity to beneﬁt from external
developments, not only to identify useful external knowledge,
but also to assimilate and apply it”. This is what has been
called a “commensalistic approach” [13]. This corresponds to
the more general assertion from [9, 10] about the necessity
for a ﬁrm to make internal efforts of R&D a prerequisite for
the absorption of external technology.
We consider this reﬂects a change in the technologies used,
thus of the complementary assets these ﬁrms need to manage,
not really in the core competences. Traditional architect ﬁrms
are not involve in FLOSS development, as they do not use
these technologies. But they may have other processes for
monitoring the evolution of the complementary asset, the
technologies they use. They may participate in editors’ training
sessions, or conclude “global alliance” with their key partners,
as Cap Gemini does21.
20Considering the evaluation part, it is worth noting that the main
service companies in France have published tools to evaluate FLOSS,
and they use this as a commercial argument (we would say a signal) to
their clients on their capacity of evaluating these products. See, for Atos,
http://www.uk.atosorigin.com/en-uk/services/solutions/systems_integration/
technologies_expertise/open_source/default.htm, and for Cap Gemini, http:
//www.capgemini.com/services/technology-services/open-source/solutions/.
21http://www.capgemini.com/collaboration/alliancepartners/ for classical al-
liance, and http://searchsystemschannel.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,









































D. Roles of Firms in FLOSS communities.
These results are consistent with Teece’s theory [48, 49],
if considering the FLOSS community and the evolution of
a technology as the asset (see table II). If ﬁrms see it as a
source of technology they do not invest. They do invest a
lot if it is the core of their business to guarantee a efﬁcient
integration of the innovations coming from the community
to this community. In between these two extrem cases, the
community is seen as a complementary asset, as ﬁrms try to
participate to follow and control the innovations coming from
the users.
Thus ﬁrms may undertake the different “roles” of the
FLOSS organization onion model22 (ﬁgure 2): core developer
(like MySQL), developer (IBM with Apache), bugs ﬁxers or
reporter (Compiere “partner” companies) or user (Asus), and
this mainly depends on their users.
This raises a series of questions on the relationship between
ﬁrms and communities which we will discuss in the following
conclusive section.
VI. CONCLUSION. TRACKING AND ASSESSING THE ROLES
OF FIRMS IN FLOSS COMMUNITIES.
Investigating the role of ﬁrms in communities, and the
maching with the theory we have proposed appeals for studies,
in, at least, two directions, where precursor works exist, but
which are still mainly unexplored.
The ﬁrst may appear technical, as it deals with data col-
lection: how can we measure ﬁrms’ role in the communities,
where the participation is individual based?
The second deals with the interaction between two kind of
organizations: ﬁrm and community. In terms of FLOSS model
efﬁciency, what competitive advantage ﬁrm participation gives,
and what that means for ﬁrm organization (the management
of their employees involved in the community) and for com-
munity organization (in terms of governance).
Actually, there is a third direction dirrectly connected with
the two ﬁrstbut a bit peripherical in the focus of this article: the
impact of a commercial involvement on FLOSS on people’s
involvement23.
A. Measuring the role of Firms.
The main issue in this part is that organizations do not
contribute by themselves to the projects, but via people hired
22This model is described by [26] and has been proposed by [11]. In a
career in a community, the successive tasks a developer may do are to use
the program, to use the mailing list(s), to report bugs and to ﬁx them, to be
a core developer.
23The study of FLOSS participants’ motivations has already generated a
vast literature, reviewed by [38] and [43], [42] among others. The role of
a person evolves with time [29], as evolve the reasons why s/he participates
[19]. May it be called the “process of joining” [26], the “role migration” [29]
or the “co-evolution of systems and communities” [59], the evolution follows
a “canonical path”, the “onion model” [26] from none to center responsability
for the future of the community. This is closed to the sociological notion of
“career” [4], as pointed out by [19] [43].
With ﬁrms, the career is becoming twofold: the community participant’s
one is connected with a more traditionnal one, the professionnal career [52].
This has potential consequences on the design of the canonical path, but also
on the motivations of “free” developers.
Figure 2: Onion model based level of involvement in FLOSS
communities targeted by ﬁrms regarding their business and the
skill of their users.
(a) Onion model of the level of involvement in FLOSS
communities (from [26])
(b) Level of users’ skill and level of involvement of ﬁrms in
FLOSS communities.
to do so. As already said, some works exist on that topic
(see [15]) and they start from ﬁrms’ people’s behavior in a
community, so using the data produced by the community.
This suffers from some limitations.
1) Collecting the behaviors of ﬁrms.: The way scholars
collect data on that topic is to look at the data produced by
To have some responsabilities in a community, you have to “participate”,
to comit to this community, and to behave as the community expects you to
behave. Firms change this toward more strategic involvement: one can be hired
to participate to a community, but with a level of involvement bounded by the
employer (ex of service ﬁrm). Can you still talk of “freedom” (of expression,
of choice, of contribution), which is “one of the roots of the FLOSS culture”
[42] and a well known incentive to participate, when people are paid to make
in practice employer’s strategy of participation?
FLOSS employees may face a contradiction, a “tension” [50] between the









































Table II: Firms’ investment in the asset “community”.
single ﬁrm community consortium open community
package ﬁrm one dominant contribute marginally if needed (to
make its package work correctly)
contribute marginally if needed (to make its package work correctly)





from technology taker to marginal
contribution in function of the
importance of the technology
from technology taker to marginal
contribution in function of the
importance of the technology
freeware strategy technology taker technology taker technology taker
the communities (email lists, source code produced and signed,
etc.) People are said belonging to a company when they sign
with a company address.
The main limitation of this regards the exhaustivity and
the coherence of the data collected: some developers do not
contribute using their employer’s address, and others do but
without employer’s agreement. However, when ﬁrms commit
themselves to a community (as IBM could have done to Linux
one), this technique may be usable to track their involvement
and their evolution in time.
But as [24] pointed out for people, looking at what ﬁrms
do does not provide information on why they do it, or if this is
driven by the management, in a word, on ﬁrms’ motivations.
2) Surveying ﬁrms’ strategies.: Looking, in the same time,
at ﬁrms’ business may provide a good validation of the
ﬁrms’ role theory we developed here: the link between their
involvement and their market.
So, we plead for completing studies of ﬁrms’ behaviors by
questionnaires, or interviews, as [43] could have done to track
people’s motivations to participate. According to us, a point
that should particularly be studied is the missions given by the
ﬁrms to developpers participating to a community: are they
hired to participate, are they hired because they participate,
and do they have a speciﬁc goal (to reach a certain level, to
take in charge certain part of the project), or participation is
the only thing required?
This is important to understand how much the employees
will involve, but also what ﬁrms bring to the community and
thus to the FLOSS ecosystem in a whole.
B. Integrating ﬁrms into the studies of FLOSS ecosystem.
The origin of the open-source rationale remains that of
developer-users pooling their development efforts for their own
needs, aiming at better access to efﬁcient tools for everyone.
Either this volunteer collaboration is initiated by individuals
or by a ﬁrm, a key condition of the success is users-developers
adhesion.
The management of the relation between an open-source
ﬁrm and the related communities is thus of crucial importance,
as a recent literature has already emphasized. [1] have
observed that to preserve the co-existence and co-operation
of two types of organisation that are based on remote albeit
not contradictory rationales, ﬁrms must, in a nutshell, “not
seek to dominate and control process”, “provide professional
management and business expertise” and “help establish an
open and trusted ecosystem”. They view such interaction as
rather osmotic than parasitic, as ﬁrm’s resources reinforce
communities sustainability. These considerations could be
easily extended from the sole framework of the communities
to the whole users base.
In the other hand, regarding community governance, do
organizations weight the same as actors like individual benevo-
lent, or, by their size, their ﬁnancial capacities, do they curve
the evolution of the communities (in terms of organization,
goals, etc.)? For instance, what does “IBM is treated the same
as any other member of the Apache Group, albeit one with
deeper pockets and more developer resources to spare” ([20],
p. 2) mean in concrete?
Actually, if we look at the level of implication of ﬁrms,
summarized in table II, ﬁrms’ involvement can be related
to different structure of ﬁrm community relation, or kind of
structuration of communities by ﬁrms:
 single ﬁrm community, when a ﬁrm control the kernel
and thus make the main decisions for the evolution of the
software and must animate the community of its users.
 consortium, when ﬁrms dominate and cooperate to de-
velop a platform (Apache, Linux). More often in that
case there exist a foundation where the main decisions
are taken, and which can hire the main responsables for
the project.
 open communities, where ﬁrms do not seem to play a
dominant role.
In the two ﬁrst cases, FLOSS communities are more ﬁrms
communities, regarding FLOSS as a way to organize the
cooperation. So the risk is that individual users are of less
weight and thus the meritocracy may be less and less true.
This may decrease the level of new demands, new propositions
provided to the community, and thus its innovative rate. This
is espacialy true for the consortium communities, where the
actor may focus on the negociation of a common standard and
do not try to integrate as much innovation as possible.
In the third case, ﬁrms have no real power, but can be more
disturbing for the stability of the community: if they use with-
out contributing, they may discourage the main contributors (
[21]). If the dynamic of the community decreases, ﬁrms will
not invest to maintain the community and may forbid their
employees to invest themselves more.
C. Lessons for open innovation regimes.
The FLOSS movement has sometimes been presented as
a canonical model of production for the open innovation
paradigm [8], and even for the knowledge society. If so, open
development may develop in ﬁelds where users are skilled









































have enough market power to force the traditional producers
to shift to an open model. The major risk in that model is to t
kill the goose that lays the golden eggs discouraging individual
participation by over control or non cooperative behaviors.
These conditions being respected, the open IP regime can be
seen as a very efﬁcient solution to the Schumpeterian dilemma
in so far as it permits a wide diffusion of knowledge, while
encouraging innovation, as producers are incited to contribute
to the development of the product they use/sell.
This regime could be named “VH open innovation regime”,
in reference to Von Hippel’s seminal work on users as inno-
vators [54]. Open initiatives have been launched in many
industries, such as biotech, remote sensing and chip design.
Most of the time, their chances of success are evaluated in
terms of the motivation of the participants and the stability of
the “community”. Our contribution argues for more economic
aspects.
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